What is right with the miracle argument: establishing a taxonomy of natural kinds by Carrier, Martin
What is Right with the Miracle Argument: 
Establishing a Taxonomy of Natural Kinds 
Martin Carrier* 
IT CERTAINLY strikes us as one of the most remarkable types of scientific 
achievement when apparently disparate phenomena are unified theoretically. 
What appeared to be disparate to the untutored eye turns out to arise from the 
same underlying mechanism and thus to be identical in kind. When a door 
slams because the windows are open and it is windy outside, this happens due 
to the same cause and according to the same mechanism that makes a plane lift 
off the ground. The prima facie conclusion is that science succeeds in going 
beyond the specious distinctions of the senses. It teaches us what things are 
truly alike. 
My aim in this paper is to examine the viability of this popular view. And 
the result will be that the view is basically correct. More precisely, I will try to 
show, first, that in some distinguished cases science arguably manages to 
induce the right classification or taxonomy among the phenomena, and that, 
second, this is the only access to reality that science is justifiably able to gain. 
Accordingly, what I am aiming to do is to support a particular and compara- 
tively weak form of scientific realism. 
Scientific realism contends that claims about certain unobservable ‘items’ 
which emerge from the theoretical or experimental activity of scientists are 
literally true; these claims faithfully refer to what is, as it were, going on behind 
the scenes. There is some quarrel, however, about what these ‘items’ are 
legitimately supposed to be. The leading brand of this doctrine is theory- 
realism. According to this position, the successful theories of mature science 
are approximately true. That is, these theories correctly portray the not- 
directly-observable processes and mechanisms that make the phenomena occur 
the way they do. 
A more attenuated version of scientific realism is entity-realism. On the one 
hand, entity-realism is an immediate consequence of theory-realism. The truth 
of a theory implies the existence of its theoretical entities. On the other hand, 
there is also a more autonomous type of entity-realism which is advanced on 
the basis of experiment-centered arguments. In this version, entity-realism says 
that the capacity to manipulate certain unobservable ntities, and, in parti- 
cular, to manipulate them in order to experiment on something else, gives 
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strong evidence for the real existence of these entities. Entity-realism is thus 
non-committal as to the (near) truth of the accepted scientific account of these 
entities. It is no theory’s entity but the experimenter’s entity to which actual 
existence is attributed. Belief in these entities does not imply belief in any one 
of the theories involved. 
An even more attenuated variant of realism, and the one I set out to 
support, is a realism of kinds. The claim is that science, at least on some rare 
and distinguished occasions, manages truthfully to forge links among the 
phenomena. Science sometimes succeeds in collecting phenomena into equiva- 
lence classes that reflect truly existing similarity relations among these pheno- 
mena. Whereas entity-realism implies a kind-realism, the reverse does not hold. 
It will be seen that commitment to the experimentally established entities 
entails commitment to the kind-structures they introduce. By contrast, the 
assumption that science is sometimes able to unveil true relations of similarity 
does not imply that the mechanisms employed to establish these relations and 
the entities they invoke reflect anything in nature. 
The argument comes in three steps. The first one is introductory. I sketch the 
notion of ‘natural kinds’ and show, using some examples from the history of 
science, that the structure of natural kinds is theory-dependent and indeed 
changes in the course of scientific progress. This finding implies that a naive 
form of a realism of kinds is untenable empirically. In the second step I 
consider the experimental route to natural kinds. The prima facie advantage of 
this alternative is that it seems to be exempt from the uncertainties and 
vicissitudes of theoretical reasoning. It turns out, however, that this position is 
likewise beset with a historical counter-example. Next comes, finally, the 
constructive step. I take up some earlier results of mine about the actual 
impact of the so-called ‘Miracle Argument’ in favor of scientific realism. The 
argument says that scientific realism is a necessary precondition for any 
explanation of scientific progress; it is the only choice for divesting progress of 
its miraculous aspects. I will argue that the Miracle Argument is insufficient for 
achieving its proper objective, namely, theory-realism, and that its real accom- 
plishment consists in showing that there are instances in which science provides 
us with a veridical portrait of relations of similarity as they prevail in nature. 
1. Changing Patterns of Natural Kinds 
Every theory determines a classification among the objects or events it deals 
with; it induces a taxonomy into its universe of discourse. The laws of the 
theory are framed using certain descriptive predicates, and the relevant objects 
obey the laws in virtue of satisfying these predicates. A law thus serves to bind 
several objects together. It establishes a link of similarity among them by 
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regarding them as instances of the same law. A so-created equivalence class of 
like objects is called a natural kind (cf. Fodor 1974, 101-102). Take, for 
example, the law: All electrons possess the elementary charge e. This law 
generates the natural kind ‘electron’ by quantifying over electrons. Electrons 
constitute a natural kind because there is a law that applies to them in virtue of 
their property of being electrons. Different laws may well pick the same natural 
kind. All further laws about electrons (such as: All electrons have a spin-value 
of )) obviously specify the same kind, namely, the class of electrons. This 
implies immediately that a theoretical change need not involve a change in the 
concomitant kind-structure. Different bodies of laws may select the same 
objects as being alike.’ 
The concept of natural kinds, as just circumscribed, is entirely non- 
committal as to the issue of scientific realism. Natural kinds are created by a 
corpus of laws irrespective of whether these laws are interpreted merely as 
useful but fictitious unifiers or are thought to refer to a theory-independent 
reality. Accordingly, natural kinds need not be truly natural, and the attribute 
‘natural’ is, strictly speaking, a misnomer. In order to avoid the realist 
overtones the expression ‘scientific kinds’ has been proposed, but this proposal 
seems not to have gained acceptance. Thus I stick to the usual term, taking its 
non-committal sense to be understood. The reality of natural kinds constitutes 
the topic of the present investigation. 
The first response to this problem presumably is that we are surely entitled 
to interpret the taxonomy specified by present-day science realistically. After 
all, its laws have undergone a large number of severe tests; they are well- 
confirmed and thus deserve our confidence. And this confidence quite naturally 
extends to the taxonomy induced by these laws. Most of us would thus be 
inclined to reason as follows. Since present-day knowledge includes laws about 
electrons, electrons form a natural kind. For this reason, electrons are in 
reality of the same kind. Let’s examine the tenability of this assessment. 
A condition familiar from the discussion of scientific realism in general is the 
following retention requirement. For a theory component to be interpreted 
realistically, it is necessary that it be retained across scientific change. In 
particular, if earlier successful theories in the mature sciences are approxi- 
mately true, then the later even more successful theories in the same discipline 
‘Note that ‘natural kind’ is used here as a technical term which does not wholly coincide with 
everyday usage. Biological species, for instance, though they are natural kinds in a rough and 
ready sense, hardly qualify as natural kinds in the present understanding. Kinds are derived from 
laws, and it is a matter of dispute in current philosophy of biology whether there are any 
specifically biological laws. In any event, a regularity of the sort ‘All ravens are black’ certainly 
does not count as a law of nature and thus does not give rise to the natural kind ‘raven’. 
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will preserve the earlier laws as limiting cases (cf. Putnam 1978, 2&24; Laudan 
1981, 234240). Applied to natural kinds this means that the kind-structure of 
earlier well-confirmed theories should be reproduced ‘in the limit’ by the kind- 
structure of their respective successor theories. 
The intuition behind the retention condition is as follows. Once-successful 
but now-rejected theories in the mature sciences were in their lifetimes well- 
confirmed according to our present methodological criteria. If such theories 
turn out to be wrong on all counts, nothing prevents us from the meta- 
inductive inference that our present most cherished accounts are likewise 
doomed to complete failure and that nothing will remain from them in the end. 
If scientific realism is supposed to be a viable position, this meta-inductive 
move has to be blocked; and it can only be blocked by assuming that these 
earlier accounts indeed got something right (cf. Putnam 1978, 25). These 
correct aspects should be retained by their respective successor theories. 
Realism about a specific item, be it theory, entity or kind, implies a retentionist 
claim with respect to this item. 
This three-fold retention condition constitutes an epistemic requirement. 
Scientific realism claims not only that there is something real out there, but 
also that we gain access to reality through science. And we can only maintain 
that we have managed to lock on to reality if the features accorded this special 
status will not be discounted through scientific progress. If science is supposed 
to get hold of reality, it is necessary that the corresponding insights are here to 
stay. Accordingly, the retention condition does not amount to the assertion 
that what is not retained can by no means be real. Rather, the claim is that we 
have no science-based justification for attributing reality to abandoned 
features. 
Scientific realism about theories thus requires preservation of theoretical 
laws, scientific realism about entities demands preservation of entities, and, 
finally, scientific realism about kinds necessitates preservation of kinds. On the 
other hand, it is certainly not requisite that the respective items be carried over 
unchanged from theory to theory. A successor theory may well have to say 
more about the corresponding aspect so that revisions cannot be excluded 
outright. The point rather is that the successor account must not completely 
overturn the relevant aspects or its predecessor. This is expressed by merely 
demanding preservation of the relevant item ‘in the limit’. Regarding theory- 
realism this means that the theoretical laws of the earlier account may be 
reproduced by a ‘corrective reduction’. That is, the derivability of the prede- 
cessor laws from the successor theory may be restricted to counterfactual 
initial and boundary conditions (cf. Carrier and Mittelstrass 1991, 42-50). As 
regards natural kinds, this means that earlier and later taxonomies have to be 
compatible in the sense that the later taxonomy can be construed as a more 
fine-grained version of the earlier one. This demands in turn that an earlier 
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kind may comprise several ater kinds, to be sure, but that there is no partial 
overlap or cross-over among the kinds involved.2 
Now we are in a position to take up the initial question: Is it justified 
unrestrictedly to interpret the taxonomy of present-day science realistically as 
it stands? It follows from the discussion that realism implies retention. As a 
consequence, non-retention favors a non-realist view. Regarding the realist 
interpretation of kinds, this leads to following empirical requirement. In order 
that a historical sequence of taxonomic structures be interpreted realistically, 
the respective kinds must stand in a relation of total inclusion. If, by contrast, 
cross-over relations among kinds typically occur in the course of theory 
changes, this tends to discredit a realist view about kinds. I will now argue that 
the inclusion condition is not satisfied typically. 
A claim of this sort is best backed by considering some examples. To begin 
with, let’s cast a brief glance at the transition from classical mechanics to 
general relativity theory. The basic taxonomic distinction involved in all 
dynamical theories is the one between force-free and force-induced motion. 
According to the classical aw of inertia, force-free motion is represented by 
uniform rectilinear motion. Conversely, the motion of a body in physical fields 
such as the gravitational or electromagnetic field counts as accelerated and 
thus as force-induced. In contradistinction, it is constitutive of general rela- 
tivity that it takes gravitation to be part of space-time structure. This means 
that gravitation-induced motion is construed as inertial motion. More pre- 
cisely, the motion of a ‘test particle’ (i.e. a small, non-rotating particle with 
negligible mass) in the exclusive presence of a gravitational field is considered 
force-free. This interpretation does not extend to other forces such as the 
electromagnetic one, however. General relativity maintains that a charged 
particle in an electromagnetic field moves non-inertially. Accordingly, gravi- 
tation-induced motion is now grouped together with classical inertial motion 
and separated from motion in an electromagnetic field. There is thus non- 
inclusion, but rather partial overlap, between the respective kind-structures. 
Another case in point is the taxonomy induced by Newton’s corpuscular 
optical theory and the modern account. ‘Newton’s rings’, i.e. the colors 
exhibited by transparent hin plates, are attributed by the current account to 
the occurrence of interference between the light waves reflected at the upper 
and lower surfaces of the plate. Newton, by contrast, explained the effect by 
appeal to his particle model. When light particles enter the plate they produce 
a longitudinal shock wave in the plate material. This shock wave moves faster 
through the plate than the light particles and puts the opposite side of the plate 
in oscillation. If this oscillatory motion happens to be counterdirected to the 
light particles’ motion upon their arrival, the surface throws the particles back; 
zThis requirement is elaborated in Buchwald 1992, 40-41. 
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otherwise it lets them pass through. The critical factor is thus the phase of the 
surface oscillation when the surface is hit by the light particles. And the salient 
point of Newton’s construction is that this phase depends on the passage time 
of the light through the plate and thus on the distance the light traverses in the 
plate. Since, furthermore, different colors are refracted differently by the same 
material, light particles representing different colors have to cover different 
distances until they reach the opposite surface of the plate. They are thus 
reflected differently. Consequently, if white light falls at a given angle of 
incidence on a transparent plate, only one color is reflected and the remainder 
is let through (cf. Newton 1730, 206214, 280, 370-371). 
The point is that Newton followed the very same approach in order to 
accommodate the permanent colors of bodies. He assumed the particles of 
bodies to be transparent and of variable size. Then he identified a body’s color 
with the light reflected by its particles according to the process described. The 
reflected color is thus dependent on the size of the respective particles (cf. 
Newton 1730, 248-256). 
The transparent parts of Bodies, according to their several sizes, reflect Rays of one 
Colour, and transmit those of another, on the same grounds that thin Plates or 
Bubbles do reflect or transmit those Rays. And this I take to be the ground of all 
their Colours. [Newton 1730, 2511 
Accordingly, the theory forges a link between Newton’s rings and the colors of 
bodies. The two phenomena arise from the same mechanism and thus form a 
natural kind. 
In contradistinction, these two phenomena are interpreted today as growing 
out of quite different mechanisms. The colors of bodies come about through a 
process of partial absorption and re-emission of the incident light by the atoms 
or molecules involved. Newton’s rings, on the other hand, are the result of 
interference. So, what once belonged into the same natural kind is now 
thought to be of entirely distinct nature. A fundamental taxonomic breach 
splits the former kind into heterogeneous components. This constitutes 
another instance of a non-inclusive taxonomic development. 
Just one more example. The caloric theory of heat assumed that heat is 
constituted by a material substance, namely, the matter of heat or caloric. 
Liquefaction and vaporization were interpreted as combinations with caloric. 
Liquids and gases are caloric compounds. This implies that vapors are in this 
respect identical to other compounds. This means that, say, oxygen gas 
belongs into the same natural kind as, say, a solid metallic oxide. Needless to 
say, this linkage has been cut by modern theory. 
In order not to multiply examples gratuitously let me stop here. I take it to 
be the upshot of the discussion that the history of science is rife with instances 
of non-inclusive kind splitting or kind cross-over. This implies that the 
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retentionist claim with respect to kinds is untenable historically, with the 
consequence that a kind-realism fails - at least in the sweeping and unquali- 
fied version given in the first part of this section. 
2. The Experimental Route to Kinds 
I: Manipulation Here Creates Kind-Structure Here 
The theory-dependence of natural kinds along with the occurrence of 
profound theoretical changes across history appears to vitiate a theory-based 
realist interpretation of kinds. An alternative option might be to dispense with 
theories altogether and to ground the kind-structure in experimental distinc- 
tions and experimenters’ abilities. It was proposed by Jed Buchwald that it is 
experimental set-ups and experimental devices that sort effects into kinds. 
Buchwald connects the evolving kind-structure of optical phenomena with the 
available laboratory equipment. The doubly refracting crystal established the 
distinction between polarized and unpolarized light. Additional invocation of 
the Fresnel rhomb produced the sub-kinds linearly and circularly (or ellipti- 
cally) polarized light. Buchwald’s claim is that ‘the apparatus proper often 
constitutes an embodiment of the relevant kind-structure’.3 
The idea underlying the experiment-centered approach to kinds seems to be 
as follows. The ability to manipulate an object or effect gives evidence of 
relations of analogy and disanalogy. If we intervene in an apparently homo- 
geneous phenomenon and manage to elicit heterogeneous, qualitatively 
distinct responses, then the components constitute different kinds. Briefly, 
what behaves differently in an experiment is different in kind. We still don’t 
know what it is that manifests itself differently, but we know it’s different. 
In the present context the question is whether the experiment-based kind- 
structure is trustworthy. It is to be admitted at once that the occurrence of 
empirical differences is indeed necessary for sorting effects into distinct cate- 
gories. Things that behave alike under all circumstances will hardly qualify as 
different in kind. The problem rather lies with the sufficiency part of the claim. 
Things that behave differently in an experiment may yet be alike. 
This peculiarity has three possible sources. First, theoretical unification. 
Different sorts of electromagnetic radiation - such as infrared, visible light, 
and ultraviolet - show different behavior. But these sorts of radiation are still 
not sufficiently different to be counted as distinct natural kinds. They rather 
constitute different instantiations of the same kind, namely, electromagnetic 
radiation. The reason is that they merely differ in the values of the pertinent 
‘Buchwald 1992, 57; for the entire argument cf. ibid. 46-58. 
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parameters, namely, frequency and wavelength, whereas they all obey one and 
the same corpus of laws. 
Second, experiment-induced distinctions may be spurious and insignificant 
because the experiments may later be discovered to be spoiled by unnoticed 
factors and uncontrolled side-effects. Consider eighteenth-century affinity 
theory as an example. The theory was created by Newton and dominated 
important parts of the chemistry of the period. Affinities were conceived as 
attractive short-range forces between particles, and chemical reaction and 
chemical bonding were attributed to their influence. Affinity forces were 
thought to be substance-specific, i.e. they should be constant for a given pair of 
substances, and to possess a point of saturation. Saturation means that a 
particle of a substance A can attract only a limited number of particles of a 
substance B. These assumptions suggest the use of substitution reactions for 
ordering affinity strengths empirically. When a substance C replaces a 
substance A in a compound AB, i.e. if the reaction AB+ C-AC+ B occurs, 
then the affinity from A to C is stronger than the one from A to B. If, in 
addition, D is able to substitute C in the compound AC, then this testifies to 
the fact that D is attracted more strongly by A than C is (cf. Newton 1730, 
376-383). Substitution reactions were employed to establish so-called ‘affinity 
series’ experimentally. At the top the substance in question was placed, and 
then followed its reaction partners in the order of decreasing affinity strength. 
The results sketched thus give rise to the following midget affinity series. A: D, 
C, B. 
The affinities operative in the presence of three substances were called 
‘simple affinities’. In addition to them, so-called ‘double affinities’ were 
assumed. Double affinities were supposed to govern reciprocal substitutions of 
the general form: AB+ CD+AC+ BD. They were considered completely 
different from simple affinities on the ground that no consistent set of relative 
affinity strengths could be found that was suitable to accommodate both types 
of substitutions. 
What we have here is a fundamental distinction between two different kinds 
of chemical reactions. Simple substitutions are determined by the action of 
simple affinities, reciprocal substitutions are guided by double affinities. The 
crucial point in the present context is that this distinction between natural 
kinds was introduced on purely experimental grounds. Reactions of both types 
appeared to instantiate different behavior; they could not be accommodated by 
an overall scheme of affinity strengths. That is, one and the same compound 
was found to behave qualitatively differently according to whether a simple or 
a double substitution was performed. 
This experiment-based distinction later collapsed completely. As Claude 
Berthollet demonstrated around 1800, the concept of affinity was defective in 
that the influences of temperature and of the quantities of the relevant 
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substances had been left out of consideration. Due to uncontrolled fluctuations 
of these factors the experiments on affinity series were unreliable; they were not 
indicative of any significant trait. Along with the constant affinity forces, the 
distinction in kind between simple and double affinities was abandoned. 
Berthollet endeavored to explain both types by one unified scheme.4 
The moral to be extracted from this episode is that experimentally intro- 
duced distinctions can later be recognized as faulty and insignificant. In the 
case sketched, a kind-distinction was revoked as a result of theoretical 
progress. What behaved differently experimentally turned out by theoretical 
reasoning to be of the same kind in the end. 
Third, it is sometimes impossible to tell from the facts alone whether various 
experimental outcomes are really heterogeneous or whether they merely repre- 
sent different instantiations of the same kind. After all, if an experiment yields 
gradually varying magnitudes of the same quantity, it does not give rise to a 
kind-distinction at all. In order that the experimental approach be sufficient o 
establish natural kinds, we must be able to recognize empirically whether the 
ensuing experimental results are qualitatively different or whether they merely 
represent changing magnitudes of one and the same quantity. An example 
from roughly the same period in the history of chemistry makes it clear, 
however, that this task is sometimes hard to accomplish. 
Consider the distinction between compounds and mixtures that Joseph 
Louis Proust introduced around 1800. Proust tried to establish empirically the 
‘law of constant proportions’ which involved precisely this distinction. The 
evidential basis was that some reactions ended up with compounds of definite 
proportions and some did not. For Proust the former constituted actual 
compounds and the latter mere mixtures or mixtures of compounds. Proust’s 
proposal was criticized by Berthollet. Berthollet’s theory implied that variable 
proportions are the rule and that constant proportions arise from the influence 
of particular additional factors. In general, compounds are characterized by 
variable proportions (cf. Carrier 1986, 374-377). 
Both rivaling approaches thus interpreted the same empirical findings 
differently. In particular, they both led to a different kind-structure. Proust’s 
difference in kind between compounds and mixtures was denied by Berthollet 
and reinterpreted as gradual change due to gradually varying influences. 
Berthollet held that the occurrence of definite proportions under some circum- 
stances arose from the presence of ephemeral factors. In fact, there is only one 
single kind that embraces Proustian compounds and mixtures alike. 
The point is that experience alone does not show who is right; it does not 
show whether the observed differences indicate differences in kind or only 
differences in magnitude. It is true that Proust finally won the day. But this 
4For this account of affinity theory cf. Carrier 1986, 328-332, 366-371. 
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victory was crucially due to the acceptance of John Dalton’s atomic theory. 
Only in this framework could a theoretical distinction between compounds and 
mixtures be drawn. The experimental evidence provided too shaky a basis for a 
non-arbitrary distinction between them. 
These examples give sufficient evidence for the conclusion that experiments 
are insufficient to distinguish among natural kinds. First such experiment- 
based distinctions may be taken back subsequently as a result of progress in 
theoretical unification. Second, their introduction may have been flawed right 
from the beginning due to the unrecognized influence of additional factors. 
Third, the distinction among natural kinds exclusively on the basis of observ- 
able differences may be entirely arbitrary due to the inability always to 
distinguish unambiguously between differences in quality and changes in 
quantity. 
3. The Experimental Route to Kinds 
II: Manipulation Here Creates Kind-Structure There 
Whereas the version of the experimental approach discussed above endea- 
vored to establish a kind-structure with respect to the phenomenon or entity 
experimented upon, another variant of the same approach leads to the 
introduction of a. kind-structure with respect to the entity used for experi- 
menting on other phenomena. At least this is the by-product of an enterprise 
whose explicit objective is to support a realist interpretation of entities. In this 
section I briefly sketch the entity-realism advanced by Nancy Cartwright and 
Ian Hacking, elaborate its implications as to a realist interpretation of kinds, 
and, finally, propose a counter-example. 
As just indicated, Cartwright and Hacking attempt to establish realism 
about entities by focusing on our experimental abilities. That is, their entity- 
realism is not a consequence of theory-realism but is supposed to stand on its 
own feet. Theory-realism is inadequate, they argue, since there is no unani- 
mously accepted body of theory about anything that is part of present-day 
research. Different scientists may hold different and sometimes incompatible 
models about the same entity; and quite legitimately so, for these different 
models suit different descriptive purposes best. Every discipline embraces a 
multitude of distinct accounts of the same theoretical entity. As a result, entity- 
realism cannot be based on the assumed truth of the relevant theories. 
By contrast, entities are rightly attributed reality when we succeed in using 
them for investigating something else. The successful manipulation of an entity 
for the sake of intervening in other processes of a more hypothetical nature is 
the best possible evidence for the existence of this entity. Fictitious entities 
have no causal powers. When we know how to use an (initially theoretical) 
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entity so as to create new phenomena, then this entity is rightly thought to be 
real (cf. Cartwright 1983, 87-99; Hacking 1983, 262-265). 
The rationale for the existence of theoretical entities thus is that they can be 
employed to exercise causal influence. Relying on them we can deliberately 
produce effects. An entity-realism of this sort implies a kind-realism if the 
entities accepted are the ones that science specifies. For science frequently 
traces different effects back to the action of one and the same entity. These 
effects are thus equal in kind in that they are brought about by similar 
mechanisms or in an otherwise similar way. In this vein, Cartwright holds 
electrons to be instrumental in the Millikan-experiment and likewise to be the 
cause of cloud-chamber tracks (cf. Cartwright 1983, 92-93, 99). Causal judg- 
ments of this sort generate a link between the two phenomena nd thus induce 
a natural-kind structure.5 
If the argument passed muster, it would indeed be suited to justify a realist 
view about kinds. In order to examine if it does, I resort to the touchstone of 
retention: for any item to be interpreted realistically, it is necessary that it is 
retained across scientific change (see Section 1). As a matter of fact, Cartwright 
herself makes a claim of roughly this sort. An entity that is experimentally 
warranted in the way sketched is ‘seldom discarded in the progress of science’ 
(Cartwright 1983, 98). I now argue that phlogiston passed the experimental 
reality test. Nevertheless, it was later abandoned. 
The phlogiston theory stands in the tradition of the ‘chemistry of principles’. 
This tradition assumed certain abstract principles or elements that were 
considered to be bearers of general properties such as hardness, combustibility 
and volatility. Empirical substances gain their properties by incorporating the 
property-bearing principles; the principles thus explain the properties of 
substances found in the laboratory. The theory did not attach one principle to 
each property; it rather introduced just a few such principles. The challenge 
was to explain the multitude of empirical properties by recourse to combina- 
tions of these few general principles. 
In the present context it is the principle of combustibility termed ‘phlogiston’ 
by Georg Ernst Stahl, the creator of the phlogiston theory, that deserves 
particular interest. In the pre-Stahlian tradition, the principle of combustibility 
was supposed to comprise a number of related sub-principles. It was Stahl’s 
chief objective to dispose of the multitude of distinct but related entities. He 
tried to demonstrate that there is only one such principle, namely, phlogiston. 
In particular, all combustion processes and all calcinations (i.e. oxidations of 
‘This feature becomes even more explicit in Cartwright’s later work on capacities. Causal claims 
are made about properties, and an individual object is causally effective because it possesses this 
property. Aspirins relieve headache because of being aspirins; cf. Cartwright 1989, 141. This 
specification obviously strongly resembles the definition of natural kinds given above-with the 
sole difference that she does not refer to laws but to ‘causal capacities’. 
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metals in modern terms) are to be interpreted in the same fashion as the release 
of phlogiston. 
This novel claim was backed by the following experiment. If the unified 
account of combustion and calcination is true, it should be possible to 
produce a metal from its calx (i.e. the corresponding metallic oxide) by 
supplying phlogiston that originates from non-metallic combustible 
substances. Stahl succeeded in verifying this prediction by producing metallic 
lead out of lead calx (PbO) by heating it with glowing charcoal. Obviously, the 
calx has accepted the phlogiston released by the charcoal and accordingly 
turned into the metal. 
After this initial empirical conformation of his unified approach, Stahl 
moved on to bring to bear the causal capacities of his newly established entity. 
He employed phlogiston so as to bring about one more formerly unknown 
phenomenon, namely, the synthesis of sulfur from sulfuric acid through the 
action of phlogiston. There were empirical indications for the view that sulfuric 
acid was in fact dephlogisticated sulfur, and Stahl managed to confirm this 
view by his then celebrated sulfur synthesis, published in 1697. 
The first step of the experiment consisted in combining sulfuric acid with 
potash (K-$03 in order to reduce its volatility. The result is ‘fixed alkali’ 
(K,SOJ, interpreted as a compound of sulfuric acid and potash. When this 
compound is brought to a glow with charcoal-whose combustibility indi- 
cates that it contains a large quantum of phlogiston- ‘liver of sulfur’ is 
formed (which is actually a mixture of various potassium-sulfur compounds 
such as K,S, or K&O,). Finally, Stahl precipitated sulfur from the reaction 
product and thus confirmed that it really contained sulfur (cf. Kopp 1873, 46 
47; Partington 1962, 673-674). 
What happened in this experiment is roughly and qualitatively represented 
by the following scheme. 
K,SO, + 
potash-sulfuric 
acid compound 
C + W,, WKh + co 
charcoal liver of sulfur (not identified) 
The experiment was supposed to embody a phlogiston transfer. The phlogiston 
released from the charcoal was taken up by the fixed alkali and transformed 
the sulfuric acid contained in it into sulfur. According to present lights, the 
core reaction that occurred is SO, + 2C+S + 2C0. 
The point of this experiment is the following. What Stahl did was to create a 
new phenomenon relying on the previously established causal properties of the 
entity in question. He manipulated phlogiston in order to experiment on 
another, more hypothetical phenomenon, namely, the composition of sulfur. 
Stahl employed phlogiston so as to intervene in and actively change other 
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processes. I conclude that phlogiston qualifies as real according to the 
Cartwright-Hacking criterion. Nonetheless, it was later given up. 
The upshot is that this reality-criterion does not single out the right entities 
as real. As a consequence, the kind-structure induced by such experimentally 
supported entities cannot be trusted in either. These kind-structures may be 
real, to be sure, but the Cartwright-Hacking criterion does not license the 
inference to their reality. We are not justified in attributing reality to kind- 
structures supported in the experimental fashion. 
It is true that Stahl’s sulfur synthesis does not strictly entail this conclusion. 
After all, Cartwright only claims that entities backed in this way are ‘seldom 
discarded’ (see above), and one single counter-instance does not trespass this 
limit. On the other hand, the history of science shows that entities are less 
frequently abandoned than theories. This stability speaks in favor of entity 
realism, to be sure, but at the same time it reduces the testability of entity 
realism by reducing the number of possible counter-examples. And, if among 
the fairly limited class of discounted entities there is (at least) one that satisfied 
the Cartwright-Hacking criterion, then this one actual counter-instance is 
sufficient to justify doubts as to the viability of the experimental approach to 
entities and, derivatively, to natural kinds.6 
4. The Distinguished-Theory Approach to Kinds 
I take it to be the upshot of the examples discussed above that neither the 
theory-based sweeping kind-realism sketched in Section 1 nor the two variants 
of the experiment-centered approach to natural kinds examined in Sections 2 
and 3 succeed in reliably establishing a realism about natural kinds. Are we 
stuck with this null result? Mercifully not, I believe. Since the experimental 
approach to kinds has not stood up to empirical scrutiny, we are back with 
theories. But in light of the results of Section 1, we cannot rest our case on just 
any theory. Still, we may appeal to a particular subset of distinguished 
theories: theories, that is, distinguished by their outstanding empirical success. 
The basis for this distinction is the so-called Miracle Argument. 
A sharpened version of the Miracle Argument says that there are two types 
of empirical success which can only be explained by recourse to realism, 
namely, novel predictions and consilience of inductions. If a theory succeeds in 
correctly predicting a novel regularity, formerly unknown and not to be 
expected against the background knowledge, this capacity is inexplicable (or 
6Meehl is certainly right in pointing out that a large number of systematically evaluated case- 
studies provides a better basis for assessing the merits of metatheoretical claims than ‘informal, 
impressionistic (and often biased) reliance on selected case studies’ (Meehl 1992, 272). Still, if the 
set of possible counter-instances - i.e. abandoned entities-is comparatively small, one actual 
counter-instance serves as a large enough sample. 
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miraculous for that matter) unless we assume that the theory has got some- 
thing right. Analogously, if a theory manages to unify regularities that 
appeared to refer to completely disparate phenomena before, and if it did so 
naturally, as it were, i.e. without introducing modifications and adjustments 
for the sake of producing the unification, this ability is simply mysterious 
unless we presume that the theory has grasped something correctly.’ 
An example of a theoretically anticipated regularity is Einstein’s prediction 
of the correct magnitude of gravitation-induced light-bending within the 
framework of general relativity theory. The theory managed to foresee what no 
experimenter had yet seen, and this remarkable achievement strongly suggests 
that it is veridical in some respect. An example of consilience of inductions is 
the connection between black-body radiation and the photoelectric effect as 
forged by Einstein’s light quantum hypothesis. Einstein realized that the two 
phenomena are likewise governed by the quantum relation E= hv, and the 
value of Planck’s constant h turned out to be identical in the two cases. It 
would indeed constitute a strange coincidence if two otherwise unrelated 
phenomena involved a numerical agreement of this sort. It is much more 
plausible to assume that the theoretical account that gives rise to this agree- 
ment truthfully reflects something real. 
The mainstream realist position is theory-based entity-realism. This position 
involves commitment to the real existence of the entities specified by successful 
scientific theories, and this existence claim is backed by the supposed (approxi- 
mate) truth of the relevant theories. It is this supposition that the Miracle 
Argument is intended to support. The intuition underlying the argument is as 
follows. There is a particular type of empirical success-that may be termed 
strong success-in which the domain of application of a theory extends itself 
naturally and without any deliberate adaptation for this purpose to pheno- 
mena the theory was not designed to accommodate. The occurrence of strong 
success is a remarkable and surprising event and is thus in need of an 
explanation. Realism provides such an explanation by arguing from the 
(approximate) truth of the theory to the existence of the relevant entities and 
their modes of interaction. A theory is strongly successful because it is 
essentially correct. This explanation is admittedly not complete since the 
empirical success of a basically correct theory may be thwarted by inadequate 
auxiliary assumptions. Although realism is thus not sufficient for the explana- 
tion of strong success it is nonetheless necessary. Without it we are at a loss to 
‘Cf. Putnam 1978, 18-19; Leplin 1984,203, 205,217; Musgrave 1988,232-234,239; see also the 
reconstruction in Carrier 1991, 24-28. It is crucial to restrict the Miracle Argument to 
distinguished types of empirical success. The sweeping version of the argument, which addresses 
predictive success simpliciter, is widely-and rightly-regarded as unsound; cf. Rescher 1987, 
65-67; Musgrave 1988, 231; Ben-Menahem 1990, 333-338. 
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account for strong success in any event. Realism thus explains how strong 
success is possible. 
The history of science teaches, however, that the Miracle Argument is in fact 
unsuitable for supporting the approximate truth of strongly successful theor- 
ies. This can be gleaned from the sketch given above of Stahl’s phlogistic 
accomplishment. Stahl correctly predicted two novel effects. He produced a 
metal from its calx through the assistance of a non-metallic substance, and he 
managed to synthesize sulfur from its purported components (see Section 3). 
But according to present lights, the theory he employed for this purpose is 
wrong, and the central entity he invoked is non-existent. So we have come 
across an instance of strong success that can obviously not be explained along 
the lines of the Miracle Argument. Two additional counter-instances are 
provided by Joseph Priestley’s prediction of the reductive properties of hydro- 
gen based on a later version of the phlogiston theory and by Dalton’s and 
Joseph Gay-Lussac’s prediction of the quality of the thermal expansion rates 
of all gases based on the caloric theory of heat8 In all these instances theories 
that are wide of the mark descriptively and referentially were nevertheless 
strongly successful. Accordingly, strongly successful theories may fail in the 
retention test. The conclusion is that the Miracle Argument does not support 
theory-based entity-realism. 
But this is not the end of the story. My claim is that the Miracle Argument is 
basically all right; it was only applied to the wrong subject matter. What the 
argument in fact supports is a realism of kinds.’ The Miracle Argument is right 
in supposing that there has to be an explanation of strong success. It is wrong 
in attributing the reason to the truth of theories and to the existence of entities. 
What explains strong success is that the corresponding theories induced the 
right relations of similarity among the phenomena in question. 
Let’s take another look at the phlogiston example. Stahl’s experiments 
worked because combustion and calcination are actually alike; they both 
constitute oxidation processes. He was only wrong in taking what is actually 
an oxygen transfer from sulfuric acid or lead oxide to charcoal to be a 
phlogiston transfer in the opposite direction. Although Stahl’s account is now 
dismissed in its entirety, the classification it induced among the phenomena 
involved is retained until the present day. Oxidation of metals and non-metals 
are still considered as being equal in kind. The same goes analogously with 
respect to the two further examples mentioned. Priestley’s novel prediction was 
borne out because - speaking in modern terms - it correctly regarded oxida- 
tion and reduction as the same process going off in opposite directions. 
‘Cf. Carrier 1991, 29-31 for an analysis of these cases. 
9The view that (in distinguished cases) a theoretically generated classification of phenomena 
reflects a real order was first advanced by Duhem; cf. Duhem 1906, 24-28. 
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Dalton’s and Gay-Lussac’s prognosis was successful because it rightly linked 
the physical constitution of gases with their equal expansion rates (cf. Carrier 
1991, 32-33). It is the retention of the kind-structure that provides the sought- 
for explanation of strong success. 
It is to be noted that kind-retention is, in general, restricted to the pheno- 
mena connected by strong success. It does not automatically extend to other 
classifications specified by the same theory. Large parts of the kind-structure 
introduced by the phlogiston theory were overturned by the subsequent 
progress of science. In the framework of this theory, sulfur and metals 
belonged in the same natural kind as wax and oil. All these substances were 
purported to be alike in that they contain a large proportion of phlogiston. 
From the contemporary perspective, by contrast, the two groups constitute 
distinct kinds. The first group includes chemical elements and the second 
organic compounds. 
The overall situation is thus as follows. We are presented with an epistemic 
argument to the effect that strongly successful theories should correctly reflect 
an aspect of reality. In order to single out this aspect we apply the retention 
test. Every theoretical feature that is supposed to reflect something real has to 
be retained across scientific change. It turns out, then, that theories and entities 
fail in this test whereas kinds pass it. The conclusion is that kind-structures 
backed by strong success are real. 
5. Establishing a Natural Taxonomy of Kinds 
It might be objected that the vast majority of the examples presented stem 
from outdated theories that may appear antediluvian to the present-day 
reader. Some may even doubt whether the phlogiston theory ever qualified as 
truly scientific. These misgivings are unjustified, however. All the theories I 
referred to were well-confirmed in their respective lifetimes according to our 
present methodological criteria and had received high marks from the corre- 
sponding scientific communities. They all formed part of ‘mature science’. 
After all, the phlogiston theory scored a strong success at its inception. 
Moreover, if we want to examine the appropriateness of retentionist claims we 
simply have to consider possible counter-instances, and such instances, in the 
nature of the case, are only provided by once successful but now rejected 
theories. Significant evidence as to retained features can only arise by 
examining what is left when everything else is gone. Accordingly, theories that 
appear strange today should not be disallowed as respectable philosophical 
examples for this reason alone. 
It is worth noting, furthermore, that the argument for the reality of 
distinguished kind-structures is not beset with the following circularity. The 
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judgment about what is real and what is not is based on present-day know- 
ledge which, however, according to the very approach advocated here, is not 
justifiably reliable in telling what there is. In fact, the argument involves no 
such circularity; its logic is as follows. Adopting scientific realism implies 
commitment to the realist interpretation of at least one aspect involved in 
contemporary scientific theories. This suggests that preceding theories that 
were once confirmed in roughly the same fashion as their successors are now 
should likewise be trustworthy ontologically with regard to the aspect in 
question. From this follows the retention condition: for anything to be counted 
as real, it is necessary that it is retained across scientific change. This condition 
is accepted by realists and anti-realists alike. In fact, the anti-realist argument 
from scientific change proceeds from precisely this condition: because nothing 
significant is retained, the realist claims are mistaken.‘O 
The second step of the argument brings to bear the judgment that strong 
success is an extraordinary and astonishing phenomenon and deserves an 
explanation. The Miracle Argument provides us with a possible reason; 
namely, it attributes strong success to the fact that the relevant parts of the 
corresponding theory truthfully reflect something real. The Miracle Argument 
is, however, quite unspecific as to what precisely constitutes this veridical 
aspect. There are three possible candidates, namely, theoretical mechanisms, 
theory-introduced entities, and theory-induced kinds. In order to determine 
which of them fills the bill the retention condition is invoked. Application of 
this condition to the history of science singles out kinds as the only theoretical 
features that may legitimately be interpreted realistically. 
In short, satisfaction of the retention condition constitutes a necessary 
precondition for the realist interpretation of a theoretical feature. It is seen, 
then, that it is at most kinds that can be so interpreted. If, in addition, the 
retained theoretical feature serves as a basis for an explanation of strong 
success, the Miracle Argument licenses its realist interpretation. Retention 
together with the capacity to furnish such an explanation is sufficient for 
attributing reality to it. If a theoretical feature passes both the miracle test and 
the retention test we are entitled to accept it as part of reality. My contention is 
that (some) natural kinds indeed pass both tests. From this follows a predic- 
tion for the future course of science: phenomena once connected by strong 
success will continue to be of the same kind in all subsequent theories on the 
subject. 
It may appear problematical to ground such a far-reaching contention on 
the discussion of no more than three cases. But in fact the evidential basis is 
not that narrow. It also includes cases in which the occurrence of strong 
success was due to theoretical aspects we still take to be correct. Consider the 
This constitutes the central contention of Laudan 1981. 
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prediction of the phases of Venus as implied by Copernicus’s theory. In this 
example of strong success, the relevant aspects of the theory, the entities 
involved, and the induced kinds are equally retained up to now. We still hold 
the view that Venus and the Earth revolve around the Sun, we still regard 
Venus, Earth, and Sun as acceptable entities, and we still stick to the kind- 
structure induced by the theory; namely, that -in contradistinction to the 
preceding account -Venus and Earth equally belong into the category 
‘planet’ and the Sun does not. Cases of this type indiscriminately support all 
three positions at stake. The examples presented in Section 4, by contrast, 
constitute differential support for kind-realism. They can only be accommo- 
dated by kind-realism. And it would be over-demanding to require that the 
class of differentially supporting instances be large. In that event the alterna- 
tive explanations would be obviously false and would never have gained the 
wide acceptance they enjoy. 
The realism of kinds advocated here involves a peculiarly non-Aristotelian 
view of kinds. In the Aristotelian tradition, kinds are individuated through 
their essential properties. The class of human beings is rightly determined on 
the basis of the characterization ‘rational animal’, but not by means of the 
attribute ‘featherless biped’. No such distinction between essential character- 
istics and accidental features is implied by the present account. Quite the 
contrary. My claim is that only the induced taxonomy, but not the theoretical 
means used for establishing it, is (in distinguished cases) justifiably to be 
considered real. It is true, our prime epistemic access to kinds is through 
theories; kinds are individuated by means of theories. Still, it is only the results, 
and not the means used for their production, that are arguably reliable 
ontologically. It is the relations of similarity among phenomena that (some- 
times) deserve our confidence. No such case can be made for the theoretical 
mechanisms employed for specifying these relations and for the entities 
involved in them. It is clear that the phenomena collected into equivalence 
classes are equivalent in some respect. But precisely what this respect is cannot 
reliably be specified. Only the relation of similarity is legitimately to be 
interpreted realistically. 
Acknowledgements-I am grateful to Peter McLaughlin, Alexander Rueger and two 
anonymous referees for their helpful comments. 
References 
Ben-Menahem, Y. (1990), ‘The Inference to the Best Explanation’, Erkenntnis 33, 
3 19-344. 
Buchwald, J. Z. (1992), ‘Kinds and the Wave Theory of Light’, Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Science 23, 39-74. 
What is Right with the Miracle Argument 409 
Carrier, M. (1986) ‘Die begriffliche Entwicklung der Affinitatstheorie im 18. 
Jahrhundert. Newtons Traum-und was daraus wurde’, Archive for History of 
Exact Sciences 36, 327-389. 
Carrier, M. (1991), ‘What is Wrong with the Miracle Argument?, Studies in History 
and Philosophy of Science 22, 23-36. 
Carrier, M. and Mittelstrass, J. (1991), Mind, Brain, Behavior: The Mind-Body Problem 
and the Philosophy of Psychology (Berlin: de Gruyter). 
Cartwright, N. (1983), How the Laws of Physics Lie (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
Cartwright, N. (1989), Nature’s Capacities and their Measurement (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press). 
Duhem, P. (1906), The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory (New York: Atheneum, 
1974). 
Fodor, J. A. (1974), ‘Special Sciences (or: The Disunity of Science as a Working 
Hypothesis)‘, Synthese 28, 97-l 15. 
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy 
of Natural Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Kopp, H. (1873) Die Entwickelung der Chemie in der neueren Zeit (Miinchen: 
Oldenbourg, 1873. Reprinted New York: Johnson; Hildesheim: Olms, 1965). 
Laudan, L. (1981). ‘A Confutation of Convergent Realism’, in Leplin 1984b, 218-249. 
Leplin, J. (1984a), ‘Truth and Scientific Progress’, in Leplin 1984b, 193-217. 
Leplin, J. (ed.) (1984b), Scient$c Realism (Berkeley: University of California Press). 
Meehl, P. E. (1992) ‘The Miracle Argument for Realism: An Important Lesson to be 
Learned by Generalizing from Carrier’s Counter-Examples’, Studies in History and 
PhiIosophy of Science 23, 267-282. 
Musgrave, A. (1988), ‘The Ultimate Argument for Scientific Realism’, in R. Nola (ed.), 
Relativism and Realism in Science (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers), 
229-252. 
Newton, I. (1730), Opticks or A Treatise of the Rejections, Refractions, Inflections & 
Colours of Light (New York: Dover, 1979). 
Partington, J. R. (1962), A History of Chemistry, Vol. II (London: MacMillan; New 
York: St. Martin’s Press). 
Putnam, H. (1978), Meaning and the Moral Sciences (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul). 
Rescher, N. (1987), ScientiJic Realism: A Critical Reappraisal (Dordrecht: Reidel). 
